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[page 129, continued:]
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It must be immediately seen that this is not a
question
of two statements between whose respective credibilities — or of two
arguments
between whose respective validities — the reason is called upon
to decide: — it is a matter of two conceptions, directly conflicting,
and
each avowedly impossible, one of which the intellect is
supposed
to be capable of entertaining, on account of the greater impossibility
of entertaining the other. The choice is not made between two
difficulties;
it is merely fancied to be made between two impossibilities.
Now
of the former, there are degrees, but of the latter, none: —
just
as our impertinent letter-writer has already suggested. A task may
be more or less difficult; but it is either possible or not possible —
there are no gradations. It might be more difficult to
overthrow
the Andes than an ant-hill; but it can be no more impossible
to
annihilate the matter of the one than the matter of the other. A man
may
jump ten feet with less difficulty than he can jump twenty, but
the impossibility of his leaping to the moon is not a whit less
than that of his leaping to the dog-star.
Since all this is undeniable: since the choice of
the mind is to be made between impossibilities of conception:
since
one impossibility cannot be greater than another: and since, thus, one
cannot be preferred to another: the philosophers who not only
maintain,
on the grounds mentioned, man’s idea of infinity but, on
account
of such supposititious idea, infinity itself — are plainly
engaged
in demonstrating one impossible thing to be possible by showing how it
is that some one other thing — is impossible too. This, it will be
said,
is nonsense, and perhaps it is; indeed I think it very capital
nonsense,
but forego all claim to it as nonsense of mine.
The readiest mode, however, of displaying the
fallacy
of the [page 130:] philosophical argument on this
question,
is by simply adverting to a fact respecting it which has been
hitherto
quite overlooked — the fact that the argument alluded to both proves
and
disproves its own proposition. “The mind is impelled,” say the
theologians
and others, “to admit a First Cause, by the
superior
difficulty it experiences in conceiving cause beyond cause without
end.”
The quibble, as before, lies in the word “difficulty;” but here
what is it employed to sustain? A First Cause. And what is a First
Cause?
An ultimate termination of causes. And what is an ultimate termination
of causes? Finity — the Finite. Thus the one quibble, in two processes,
by God knows how many philosophers, is made to support now Finity and
now
Infinity; could it not be brought to support something besides? As for
the quibbles, they, at least, are insupportable. But, to
dismiss
them; what they prove in the one case is the identical nothing which
they
demonstrate in the other.
Of course, no one will suppose that I here
contend
for the absolute impossibility of that which we attempt to
convey
in the word “Infinity.” My purpose is but to show the folly of
endeavoring
to prove Infinity itself, or even our conception of it, by any such
blundering
ratiocination as that which is ordinarily employed.
Nevertheless, as an individual, I may be
permitted
to say that I cannot conceive Infinity, and am convinced that
no
human being can. A mind not thoroughly self-conscious, not accustomed
to
the introspective analysis of its own operations, will, it is true,
often
deceive itself by supposing that it has entertained the
conception
of which we speak. In the effort to entertain it, we proceed step
beyond
step, we fancy point still beyond point; and so long as we continue
the effort, it may be said, in fact, that we are tending to the
formation of the idea designed; while the strength of the impression
that
we actually form or have formed [[it]], is in the ratio of the period
during
which we keep up the mental endeavor. But it is in the act of
discontinuing
the endeavor — of fulfilling (as we think) the idea — of putting the
finishing
stroke (as we suppose) to the conception — that we overthrow at once
the
whole fabric of our fancy by resting upon some one ultimate, and,
therefore,
definite point. This fact, however, we fail to perceive, on account of
the absolute coincidence, in time, between the settling down upon the [page
131:] ultimate point and the act of cessation in thinking.
In
attempting, on the other hand, to frame the idea of a limited space,
we merely converse the processes which involve the impossibility.
We believe in a God. We may or may not believe
in finite or in infinite space; but our belief, in such cases, is more
properly designated as faith, and is a matter quite distinct
from
that belief proper — from that intellectual belief — which
presupposes
the mental conception.
The fact is, that, upon the enunciation of any
one
of that class of terms to which “Infinity” belongs — the class
representing thoughts of thought — he who has a right to say
that
he thinks at
all, feels himself called upon, not to entertain a
conception,
but simply to direct his mental vision toward some given point, in the
intellectual
firmament, where lies a nebula never to be solved. To solve it, indeed,
he makes no effort; for with a rapid instinct he comprehends, not only
the impossibility, but, as regards all human purposes, the inessentiality
of its solution. He perceives that the Deity has not designed
it
to be solved. He sees, at once, that it lies out of the brain of
man, and even how, if not exactly why, it lies out of
it.
There are people, I am aware, who, busying themselves in
attempts
at the unattainable, acquire very easily, by dint of the jargon they
emit,
among those thinkers-that-they-think with whom darkness and depth are
synonymous, a kind of cuttle-fish reputation for profundity; but the
finest
quality of Thought is its self-cognizance; and with some little
equivocation,
it may be said that no fog of the mind can well be greater than that
which,
extending to the very boundaries of the mental domain, shuts out even
these
boundaries themselves from comprehension.
It will now be understood that, in using the
phrase,
“Infinity of Space,” I make no call upon the reader to entertain the
impossible
conception of an absolute infinity. I refer simply to the “utmost
conceivable expanse” of space — a shadowy and fluctuating domain,
now
shrinking, now swelling, with the vacillating energies of the
imagination.
Hitherto, the Universe of stars has
always
been considered as coincident with the Universe proper, as I have
defined
it in the commencement of this Discourse. It has been always either
directly [page 132:] or indirectly assumed — at
least since
the dawn of intelligible Astronomy — that, were it possible for us to
attain
any given point in space, we should still find, on all sides of us, an
interminable succession of stars. This was the untenable idea of Pascal
when making perhaps the most successful attempt ever made, at
periphrasing
the conception for which we struggle in the word “Universe.” “It is a
sphere,”
he says, “of which the centre is everywhere, the circumference
nowhere.”
But although this intended definition is, in fact, no
definition
of the Universe of stars, we may accept it, with some mental
reservation,
as a definition (rigorous enough for all practical purposes) of the
Universe proper — that is to say, of the Universe of space.
This
latter,
then, let us regard as “a sphere of which the centre is everywhere,
the circumference nowhere.” In fact, while we find it
impossible
to fancy an end to space, we have no difficulty in picturing to
ourselves
any one of an infinity of beginnings.
As our starting point, then, let us adopt the Godhead.
Of this Godhead, in itself, he alone is not imbecile — he alone
is
not impious who propounds — nothing. “Nous ne connaissons rien,”
says the Baron de Bielfeld — “Nous ne connaissons rien de la nature
ou de l’essence de Dieu: — pour savoir ce qu’il est, il faut
être Dieu même.” — “We know absolutely nothing
of the
nature
or essence of God: — in order to comprehend what he is, we should
have
to be God ourselves.”
“We should have to be God ourselves!
” —
With
a phrase so startling as this yet ringing in my ears, I nevertheless
venture
to demand if this our present ignorance of the Deity is an ignorance to
which the soul is everlastingly condemned.
By Him, however — now, at least,
the
Incomprehensible — by Him — assuming Him as Spirit — that
is to
say,
as not Matter — a distinction which, for all intelligible
purposes,
will stand well instead of a definition — by Him, then, existing as
Spirit,
let us content ourselves, to-night, with supposing to have been created,
or
made out of Nothing, by dint of his Volition — at some point of Space
which
we will take as a centre — at some period into which we do not pretend
to
inquire, but at all events immensely remote — by Him, then again, let
us
suppose to have been created — what? This is a vitally
momentous
epoch in our considerations. [page 133:] What
is it that we are justified — that alone we are justified in supposing
to have been, primarily and solely created?
We have attained a point where only Intuition
can aid us: — but now let me recur to the idea which I have already
suggested
as that alone which we can properly entertain of intuition. It is but the
conviction arising from those inductions or deductions of which the
processes
are so shadowy as to escape our consciousness, elude our reason, or
defy
our capacity of expression. With this understanding, I now
assert —
that an intuition altogether irresistible, although inexpressible,
forces
me to the conclusion that what God originally created — that that
Matter
which, by dint of his Volition, he first made from his Spirit, or from
Nihility, could have been nothing but Matter in its
utmost
conceivable state of — what? — of Simplicity?
This will be found the sole absolute assumption
of my Discourse. I use the word “assumption” in its ordinary sense; yet
I maintain that even this my primary proposition, is very, very far
indeed,
from
being really a mere assumption. Nothing was ever more certainly — no
human
conclusion was ever, in fact, more regularly — more rigorously deduced:
— but, alas! the processes lie out of the human analysis — at all
events
are beyond the utterance of the human tongue.
Let us now endeavor to conceive what Matter must
be, when, or if, in its absolute extreme of Simplicity. Here
the
Reason flies at once to Imparticularity — to a particle — to one
particle — a particle of one kind — of one character
— of one nature — of one size — of one form — a
particle,
therefore,
“without form and void” — a particle positively a particle at
all
points — a particle absolutely unique, individual, undivided, and not
indivisible
only because He who created it, by dint of His Will, can by an
infinitely
less energetic exercise of the same Will, as a matter of course, divide
it.
Oneness, then, is all that I predicate of
the
originally created Matter; but I propose to show that this Oneness
is
a principle abundantly sufficient to account for the constitution, the
existing phænomena and the plainly inevitable annihilation
of
at least the material Universe.
The willing into being the primordial particle,
has
completed [page 134:] the act, or more properly
the conception of Creation. We now proceed to the
ultimate purpose
for which we are to suppose the Particle created — that is to say, the
ultimate purpose so far as our considerations yet enable us to
see
it — the constitution of the Universe from it, the Particle.
This constitution has been effected by forcing
the originally and therefore normally One into the abnormal
condition
of Many. An action of this character implies reaction. A
diffusion
from Unity, under the conditions, involves a tendency to return into
Unity
— a tendency ineradicable until satisfied. But on these points I will
speak
more fully hereafter.
The assumption of absolute Unity in the
primordial
Particle includes that of infinite divisibility. Let us conceive the
Particle,
then, to be only not totally exhausted by diffusion into Space. From
the
one Particle, as a centre, let us suppose to be irradiated spherically
—
in all directions — to immeasurable but still definite distances in the
previously vacant space — a certain inexpressibly great yet limited
number
of unimaginably yet not infinitely minute atoms.
Now, of these atoms, thus diffused, or upon
diffusion,
what conditions are we permitted — not to assume, but to infer, from
consideration
as well of their source as of the character of the design apparent in
their
diffusion? Unity being their source, and difference from
Unity
the character of the design manifested in their diffusion, we are
warranted
in supposing this character to be at least generally preserved
throughout
the design, and to form a portion of the design itself;— that is to
say,
we shall be warranted in conceiving continual differences at all points
from the uniquity and simplicity of the origin. But, for these reasons,
shall we be justified in imagining the atoms heterogeneous, dissimilar,
unequal, and inequidistant? More explicitly — are we to consider no two
atoms as, at their diffusion, of the same nature, or of the same form,
or of the same size? — and, after fulfilment of their diffusion into
Space,
is absolute inequidistance, each from each, to be understood of all of
them? In such arrangement, under such conditions, we most easily and
immediately
comprehend the subsequent most feasible carrying out to completion of
any
such design as that which I have suggested — the design of variety out
of unity — [page 135:] diversity out of sameness —
heterogeneity out of homogeneity — complexity out of simplicity — in a
word, the utmost possible multiplicity of relation out of
the emphatically irrelative One. Undoubtedly, therefore, we should
be warranted in assuming all that has been mentioned, but for the
reflection,
first, that supererogation is not presumable of any Divine Act; and,
secondly,
that the object supposed in view, appears as feasible when some of the
conditions
in question are dispensed with, in the beginning, as when all are
understood
immediately to exist. I mean to say that some are involved in the rest,
or so instantaneous a consequence of them as to make the distinction
inappreciable.
Difference of size, for example, will at once be brought about
through
the tendency of one atom to a second, in preference to a third, on
account
of particular inequidistance; which is to be comprehended as particular
inequidistances between centres of quantity, in neighboring atoms of
different
form — a matter not at all interfering with the generally-equable
distribution
of the atoms. Difference of kind, too, is easily
conceived
to be merely a result of differences in size and form, taken more or
less
conjointly: — in fact, since the Unity of the Particle Proper
implies
absolute homogeneity, we cannot imagine the atoms, at their diffusion,
differing in kind, without imagining, at the same time, a special
exercise
of the Divine Will, at the emission of each atom, for the purpose of
effecting,
in each, a change of its essential nature: — and so fantastic an idea
is
the less to be indulged, as the object proposed is seen to be
thoroughly
attainable without such minute and elaborate interposition. We
perceive,
therefore, upon the whole, that it would be supererogatory, and
consequently
unphilosophical, to predicate of the atoms, in view of their purposes,
any thing more than difference of form at their dispersion,
with
particular inequidistance after it — all other differences arising at
once
out of these, in the very first processes of mass-constitution: — We
thus
establish the Universe on a purely geometrical basis. Of
course,
it is by no means necessary to assume absolute difference, even of
form,
among all the atoms irradiated — any more than absolute
particular
inequidistance of each from each. We are required to conceive merely
that
no neighboring atoms are of similar form — no atoms which can
ever
approximate, until their inevitable reunition at the end. [page
136:]
Although the immediate and perpetual tendency
of the disunited atoms to return into their normal Unity, is implied,
as
I have said, in their abnormal diffusion, still it is clear that this
tendency
will be without consequence — a tendency and no more — until the
diffusive
energy, in ceasing to be exerted, shall leave it, the tendency,
free to seek its satisfaction. The Divine Act, however, being
considered
as determinate, and discontinued on fulfilment of the diffusion, we
understand,
at once, a rëaction — in other words, a satisfiable
tendency of the disunited atoms to return into One.
But the diffusive energy being withdrawn, and the
reaction having commenced in furtherance of the ultimate design — that
of the utmost possible Relation — this design is now in danger of
being
frustrated, in detail, by reason of that very tendency to return which
is to effect its accomplishment in general. Multiplicity is the
object; but there is nothing to prevent proximate atoms from lapsing at
once, through the now satisfiable tendency — before the
fulfilment
of any ends proposed in multiplicity — into absolute oneness among
themselves: —
there is nothing to impede the aggregation of various unique
masses,
at various points of space: — in other words, nothing to interfere with
the accumulation of various masses, each absolutely One.
For the effectual and thorough completion of the
general
design,
we thus see the necessity for a repulsion of limited capacity — a
separate something which, on withdrawal of the diffusive
Volition, shall
at the same time allow the approach, and forbid the junction, of the
atoms;
suffering them infinitely to approximate, while denying them positive
contact;
in a word, having the power — up to a certain epoch — of
preventing
their coalition, but no ability to interfere with their coalescence
in any respect or degree. The repulsion, already considered as
so
peculiarly limited in other regards, must be understood, let me repeat,
as having power to prevent absolute coalition, only up to a certain
epoch. Unless we are to conceive that the appetite for Unity among
the atoms is doomed to be satisfied never — unless we are to
conceive
that what had a beginning is to have no end — a conception which cannot
really be entertained, however much we may talk or
dream of
entertaining
it — we are forced to conclude that the repulsive influence imagined,
will,
finally — under pressure of the Uni-tendency collectively [page
137:] applied, but never and in no degree until, on
fulfilment
of the Divine purposes, such collective application shall be naturally
made — yield to a force which, at that ultimate epoch, shall be the
superior
force precisely to the extent required, and thus permit the universal
subsidence
into the inevitable, because original and therefore normal, One.
The conditions here to be reconciled are difficult indeed: — we cannot
even
comprehend the possibility of their conciliation; — nevertheless,
the
apparent impossibility is brilliantly suggestive.
That the repulsive something actually exists, we
see. Man neither employs, nor knows, a force sufficient to bring
two
atoms into contact. This is but the well-established proposition of the
impenetrability of matter. All Experiment proves — all Philosophy
admits
it. The design of the repulsion — the necessity for its
existence
— I have endeavored to show; but from all attempt at investigating its
nature have religiously abstained; this on account of an intuitive
conviction
that the principle at issue is strictly spiritual — lies in a recess
impervious
to our present understanding — lies involved in a consideration of what
now — in our human state — is not to be considered — in a
consideration
of Spirit in itself. I feel, in a word, that here the God has
interposed,
and here only, because here and here only the knot demanded the
interposition
of the God.
In fact, while the tendency of the diffused atoms
to return into Unity, will be recognized, at once, as the principle of
the
Newtonian Gravity, what I have spoken of as a repulsive influence
prescribing
limits to the (immediate) satisfaction of the tendency, will be
understood
as that which we have been in the practice of designating now
as
heat, now as magnetism, now as electricity; displaying our
ignorance
of its awful character in the vacillation of the phraseology with which
we endeavor to circumscribe it.
Calling it, merely for the moment, electricity,
we
know that all experimental analysis of electricity has given, as an
ultimate
result, the principle, or seeming principle, heterogeneity. Only
where things differ, is electricity apparent; and it is presumable that
they never differ where it is not developed at least, if not
apparent.
Now, this result is in the fullest keeping with that which I have
reached
unempirically. The design of the repulsive influence I [page
138:]
have maintained to be that of preventing immediate Unity among the
diffused
atoms; and these atoms are represented as different each from each. Difference
is their character — their essentiality — just as no-difference
was the essentiality of their course. When we say, then, that an
attempt
to bring any two of these atoms together would induce an effort, on the
part of the repulsive influence, to prevent the contact, we may as well
use the strictly convertible sentence that an attempt to bring together
any two differences will result in a development of electricity. All
existing
bodies, of course, are composed of these atoms in proximate contact,
and
are therefore to be considered as mere assemblages of more or fewer
differences;
and the resistance made by the repulsive spirit, on bringing together
any
two such assemblages, would be in the ratio of the two sums of the
differences
in each: — an expression which, when reduced, is equivalent to this: — The
amount of electricity developed on the approximation of two bodies is
proportional
with the difference between the respective sums of the atoms of which
the
bodies, are composed. That no two bodies are absolutely
alike, is a
simple corollary from all that has been here said. Electricity,
therefore,
existing always, is developed whenever any bodies, but manifested
only when bodies of appreciable difference, are brought
into
approximation. |
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